This paper analyzes changes in the allocation of child labor within the household in reaction to exogenous shocks created by a social program in Nicaragua. The paper shows that households that randomly received a conditional cash transfer compensated for some of the intra-household differences, as they reduce child labor more for older boys who used to work more and for boys that were further behind in school. The results also show that households that randomly received a productive investment grant targeted at women, in addition to the basic conditional cash transfer benefits, show an increased specialization of older girls in nonagricultural and domestic work, but no overall increase in girls' child labor. The findings suggest that time allocation and specialization patterns in child labor within the household are important factors to understand the impact of a social program. JEL Codes: D13, J16, J22, J24, O12 Keywords: Child labor, intra-household, human capital, impact evaluation, gender * The World Bank. **Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
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Leveling the Intra-household Playing Field: Compensation and Specialization in Child Labor Allocation
Child labor in developing countries is a topic of debate and concern for many policy makers. The literature on child labor has discussed the complicated trade-offs that are often involved in parental decision-making on child labor, and has shed light on how various household characteristics and different contexts might affect such decisions (Basu, 1999; Edmonds, 2007) . Less is known about child-specific characteristics parents take into account when assigning responsibilities for the various work tasks within the household. Parents' decisions could either reinforce existing differences between children by investing more in those children that have accumulated higher human capital or more natural or social endowments, or they could compensate for deficiencies through targeted investments. A positive shock might lead households to compensate for or reinforce existing differences. To the extent that such investments compete with, or possibly complement, children's time working, we would expect this to be reflected in the intrahousehold child labor allocations. This paper therefore aims at analyzing how the allocation of tasks among children within a household changes in response to a social program. It first shows that childspecific characteristics can help shed light on the allocation tasks among children in a household. It then analyzes whether the exogenous shocks created by a social program resulted in compensation or reinforcement of pre-program differences in child labor allocation and human capital accumulation. As such, it emphasizes the heterogeneity of program impact within the household, including secondary program effects resulting from the reallocation of child labor between children of the same household. In particular, we analyze whether such reallocation helped to compensate, or rather exacerbate, disadvantages of certain types of children within the households, considering various categories based on gender, age and academic achievement.
The program we analyze is called Atencion a Crisis, a conditional cash transfer program (CCT) in Nicaragua. Women in randomly selected treatment communities received a bi-monthly sizable cash transfer conditional on school enrollment and attendance of primary school children.
1 A random subset of the beneficiaries in addition received a grant aimed at increasing their productive capacity in a nonagricultural activity. The empirical identification strategy in this paper relies on this two-staged randomized design to analyze the various factors that might affect child labor allocation.
To understand the intra-household allocations specifically, we use a household fixed effects model. This allows controlling for the many observed and unobserved household characteristics that could affect child labor. More interestingly, the use of a household fixed effects approach allows looking within the household to investigate whether and how child labor gets reallocated between siblings, when a program relaxes budget constraints and imposes conditionalities on children's schooling. The use of the fixed effects implies that the sample considered only includes households that have at least 2 children, but these are exactly the households for which reallocation between children is relevant.
To our knowledge, there are only two papers that consider intra-household child labor reallocation in the context of cash transfer programs. Filmer and Schady (2008) show that a conditional fellowship program targeted at individual children in Cambodia reduced child labor for eligible children, and did not affect work of ineligible siblings. On the other hand, analyzing impacts of a conditional cash transfer program targeted at individual children in Colombia, Barrera-Osorio et al. (2008) find negative spillover effects on other children in the household. This paper differs as we do not address whether parents reallocate child labor to children not affected by the conditionality; instead, we consider whether the program leads to a reallocation of child labor that helps compensate, or instead exacerbates, past disadvantages by age, gender, and past academic achievement.
The conditional cash transfers were similar to those of a prior CCT program in Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS). The total transfer for households with eligible children included a fixed amount of 235$ per household, and an additional 25$ for each child with a binding conditionality. This amounts to about 15-20% of average household expenditures. 2 In Atencion a Crisis the conditionality was binding for children between 7 and 15 years old that had not completed primary school. Given that delays in primary school are extremely common, the data does not contain enough households with both conditioned and unconditioned children in order to analyze possible reallocation of child labor to unconditioned children. Section III will discuss the existing variation in the data in more detail.
Other studies that analyze intra-household differences in child labor mainly focus on heterogeneity by birth order Ejrnaes and Portner, 2004; Emerson and Souza, 2008; Manacorda, 2006) . Intra-household heterogeneity along other characteristics has received less attention. Yet, there is a large related literature on intra-household differences in investments in education, health and nutrition (Behrman, Pollack and Taubman, 1986; Das Gupta, 1987; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1992; Foster, 1995) . Differences in intra-household bargaining power between spouses often can lead to differences in resource spending between children of the same household (Thomas, 1997; Duflo, 2003) . This can be reinforced by households' coping mechanisms in the face of negative shocks (Behrman, 1988; Behrman and Deolalikar 1988) . Vice versa, a positive income shock can help to compensate for existing differences (Rose, 1999; Mansuri, 2006) . And expected return can affect parental decisions. Rangel (2008) provides striking evidence that skin color helps explain differences in human capital investments between siblings in Brazil.
In this paper, we first consider whether the program helped to compensate for existing imbalances in child labor along gender lines. We then analyze whether the program helped parents to compensate for lags in academic achievement by reducing child labor more for children with lower past academic achievement. Both gender and past academic achievement are factors that parents are likely to take into account when considering the returns to schooling and the assignment of different child labor tasks within the household.
If parents decide on child labor allocations according to the expected returns, existing specialization patterns in society that require boys and girls to be prepared for different types of tasks might matter for child labor allocation. However, in the presence of a social intervention, the expected returns can change, potentially favoring children who would not be favored in regular circumstances. This is particularly the case given that CCTs give families direct transfers conditional on all primary-school-age children attending school. In addition, in households that received the CCT and the productive investment grant, women are likely to dedicate themselves more to nonagricultural economic tasks. This might increase return to girls' labor in these nonagricultural activities, but also in domestic tasks to the extent they need to substitute for mother's work.
Parents also may consider past academic achievement when considering returns to both specific child labor tasks and returns to further schooling, which can compete with child labor. Past academic achievement is likely to capture a combination of innate ability and accumulated skills, which might be the result of past disadvantages, negative shocks, and investment decisions that could have affected different children in the households differently. 3 It is a priori unclear whether the positive program income shock linked with the conditionalities would lead to compensation or reinforcement of existing differences.
Parents may reduce child labor more for children without lags and exacerbate intrahousehold differences, or they could decrease child labor more for children with existing lags, possibly helping to compensate for past delays. While academic achievement is a measure of both innate ability and accumulated skill, this question relates to the debate on parents human capital decisions as a response to innate abilities. Becker (1991) predicts that parents will invest more in the human capital of abler children, but, in the case of rich families, parents make compensatory transfers to less able children. Empirical results for the US are mixed, as some find that parents compensate for deficiencies in children's endowments or prejudices from cultural biases (Becker and Tomes 1976; Wilhelm, 1996; Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998; Ermish and Francesconi, 2000) , while other results suggest that investments by parents reinforce genetic endowment (whether intelligence or gender) and/or labor-market biases (Kim, 2005 ).
This paper first shows that child labor is distributed unequally within the household, and that there appear to be clear patterns of specialization. In particular, while total amount of hours worked do not differ significantly by gender, boys work more hours than girls in economic activities, and this difference comes primarily from work in agriculture. Girls work more in domestic activities and livestock. The trade-off between schooling and work appears to be stronger for boys, possibly due to the specialization in agriculture that competes, in terms of when the activity takes place, more directly with schooling. Intriguingly however, children that are attending school are working more hours in nonagricultural activities than their siblings.
The paper then shows that the program helped compensate for some of these intra-household differences, but exacerbated others. In particular, it reduced total hours worked more for older boys, and for boys with low past academic achievements.
Households that, in addition to the CCT, randomly received the productive investment grant show an increased specialization of older girls in nonagricultural and domestic work, but no overall increase in older girls' child labor. (2006) and Glewwe and Olinto (2004) find no significant impacts for Colombia and Honduras.
Often there appears to be marked heterogeneity in program impacts, both by child characteristics, and by the type of work considered. In Mexico, the largest overall impacts were found for older boys, while there was a reduction in domestic work for girls (Skoufias and Parker, 2001 , see also Djebbari and Smith, 2008) . In Colombia, where there is no overall impact on child work, the program did lead to a reduction of time allocated to domestic chores (Attanasio et al, 2006) . And in Ecuador, impacts on child labor are especially large for those children vulnerable to transitioning from school to work, with impacts concentrated in work-for-pay outside of the home (Edmonds and Schady, 2008) . For the specific case of Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS),
has been shown to reduce child labor substantially (9%) and more so for older children. Dammert (2009) has analyzed heterogeneity of impacts of RPS along household and community welfare indicators.
Our paper contributes to, and is distinct from, the above literature, by focusing on the intra-household reallocation. The paper further differs from most previous work because the program has three different intervention packages, which allows shedding further light on specialization patterns within the household, when more economic activities become available together with higher income from the transfer program. Macours and Vakis (2008a) show that beneficiary households who received the productive investment grant in addition to the CCT had indeed higher incomes from nonagricultural self-employment. Del Carpio (2008) shows that the program led to a shift of child labor to such nonagricultural activities, and an overall decline in total child labor hours. In related findings, Macours and Vakis (2008a) show that the program increased school enrollment and attendance, while Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2008) show parents also increased investment in preschool children, leading to improvements in cognitive development.
As has become common in the child labor literature, we consider not only the total amount of hours worked, but also the composition of labor by disaggregating work in hours by various non-domestic and domestic activities. Edmonds (2006) and Kruger and Berthelon (2007) , among others, have demonstrated that the inclusion of domestic work can be key to shed light on gender differences, as girls might be disproportionately assigned to domestic tasks. The differentiation between different tasks is also important as some tasks are more likely to compete with schooling in terms of timing, while parents could consider experience in other tasks as complementary to human capital investment through schooling. This could be the case because some child labor might result in learning new skills---such as counting and handling money in a small shop or engaging in commerce while selling goods in the community (Edmonds, 2007) , or learning about agricultural practices which might increase future returns in agriculture (Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti, 2006) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part II provides the necessary background on the program and its randomization. In part III we turn to the data, discuss the patterns in intra-household labor allocation, and derive hypotheses related to the program impact. In part IV we present the main results of the paper, and show how the program impacts differ between siblings with different gender and with differences in past academic achievements. Part V concludes.
II. Background on the program
II.1. Program design
The Nicaragua. 4 The program was implemented in the aftermath of a severe drought and had two objectives. First, it aimed to serve as a short-run safety net by reducing the impact of the aggregate shock on human and physical capital investments. This was facilitated via cash transfers, which were envisioned to reduce the need for ex-post, adverse coping mechanisms, such as asset sales, taking children out of school or reductions in food consumption. Second, the program also intended to promote long run upward mobility and poverty reduction through asset creation by enhancing households' asset base and income diversification capacity.
In order to achieve these objectives, and building on the already existing and successful conditional cash transfer model in Nicaragua (Red de Protección Social -RPS), the program introduced 3 different packages in order to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of each to reach the objectives stated above. Specifically, a total of 3,000
households were selected to participate in the program. These households were allocated one of three different packages through a participatory lottery, organized in each community: (i) the basic CCT; (ii) the basic CCT plus a scholarship for an occupational training; and (iii) the basic CCT plus a grant for productive investments.
All selected beneficiary households received the basic CCT consisting of cash transfers conditional on children's primary school and health service attendance. The school conditionality specifically implied that older children, who had not yet completed primary school, had to enroll and regularly attend school. Note that while children in principle can finish primary school by the age of 12, few children do, which is why the program included older children in the conditionality in the first place. In the data, the schooling conditionality is binding for 88 % of children between 7 and 15. 5 School enrollment and attendance were monitored by the ministry, through data received from the primary school teachers, and this monitoring was successfully implemented (Aguilera et al., 2006) .
In addition to the CCT, one third of the beneficiary households also received a scholarship that allowed one of the household members to choose among a number of vocational training courses offered in the municipal headquarters. However, due to implementation delays, the vocational training courses had not started yet at the moment of the follow-up survey. Finally, another third of the beneficiary households received, in addition to the basic CCT, a grant for productive investments aimed at encouraging recipients to start a small non-agricultural activity with the goal of asset creation and income diversification. This grant was conditional on the household developing a business development plan, outlining the investments outside of subsistence farming in new livestock or non-agricultural income generating activities. This package included technical assistance and training in basic commercial skills. Henceforth, the term "productive investment package" refers to the entire package received by this group of households, i.e. the combination of the CCT, the productive investment grant, and the technical assistance and basic commercial training. The beneficiaries of this productive investment package had received the largest amount of benefits at the moment of the follow-up survey: 2-3 months before being surveyed they had received $175 to invest. 
II.2. Program randomization
The program was targeted to 6 municipalities of the drought region in the northwest of Nicaragua. These were municipalities that met both criteria of having been affected by a drought the previous year and by the high prevalence of extreme rural poverty based on the national poverty map. From the list of all communities in the 6 municipalities, 56 intervention and 50 control communities were randomly selected through a lottery to which the mayors of the 6 municipalities were invited to attend and participate. 7 Baseline data were then used to define program eligibility based on poverty and vulnerability, resulting in the identification of 3,000 households to participate in the 6 The remaining $25 was to be paid on the next payment day (after survey completion). 7 Households were notified that current funding of the project implied that the program would last 1 year, and would only cover the treatment communities. They were also notified that if there was a decision to scale up the program after the initial year, the control communities would be incorporated. Given that 2006 was a presidential election year in Nicaragua, and a change of government was possible, households understood the uncertainty about the possibility that the program would be scaled up.
program. 8 Finally, from each eligible household, the female household member that was reported as the children's primary caregiver was invited to a registration assembly. 9 At the end of each assembly, all the beneficiaries participated in a lottery process through which the three packages described above were randomly allocated among the eligible households.
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The random assignment was successfully implemented. Table 1 presents the randomization results for the sample of eligible households relevant for the analysis in this paper, i.e. households with at least 2 children between 6 and 15 years old. The differences between households in treatment and control communities are small and not statistically significant. Similarly, the differences between households with the productive investment package and households in the control communities are generally small and not significant.
Finally, take-up of the overall program among eligible households was 95%, with the main selection due to exclusion by leaders (see footnote 6) and some outmigration.
Take-up of the productive investment grant among households in the program was near 100%.
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III. Data, Descriptive Patterns, and Hypotheses
III.1. Data
The data comes from a household panel in the control and treatment communities.
In treatment communities, data were collected from all households. In control communities, a random sample of households was selected to obtain a control group of 8 The eligibility criteria were determined using the proxy means methodology developed for the RPS and based on the national household data from 2001 (EMNV). Additional discussions with local leaders from each intervention community were conducted to identify possible exclusion or inclusions errors. Based on this, the list of eligible households was finalized. Based on the discussions with leaders, 3.72% of all the households considered were re-assigned from non-eligible to eligible, and 3.65% from eligible to noneligible. To avoid any possible selection bias resulting from the re-assignment by the leaders, all estimates in this paper are intent-to treat estimates, using the intent-to-treat as defined by the proxy means methodology. 9 Only in the few cases that there was no adult female in the household, an adult man was selected as the program recipient. 10 Participation by the invited beneficiaries to the assemblies and lotteries was near 100%.
11 While the productive investment grant was conditional on making a business plan, households received technical assistance in order to make a business plan, and were in addition given the opportunity to submit to revise their plans if they were not initially approved, which explains the almost universal take-up.
equal size as each of the three intervention groups. 12 The follow-up data was collected 9 months after the start of the program. The attrition rate of the second round was 1.3 percent of the original households. shows that 60 % of households have at least one boy and one girl between 6 and 15 years old, and almost 80% of households has at least one child between 6 and 10 years old, and 12 About 1100 households were sampled in the control communities. Out of those about 1000 are identified as "eligible" households using the same proxy means method as used for the treatment. These are the control households included in the intent-to-treat estimates. 13 The low attrition rate was the result of tracking both households and individual household members that had moved since the baseline.
one child between 10 and 15 years old. 14 The table further shows that when we divide children in finer categories (by age-gender groups, or academic achievement-gender groups) we still have a reasonable number of households with children in the different categories, suggesting the results in this paper are unlikely to be driven by outliers.
15 Table 1 further shows that these shares are similar in the different treatment and control groups.
III.2. Child labor allocation patterns
Before considering the program impact, we describe the child labor patterns among children from the control group. 16 Child labor is measured in number of hours Table 2 shows that including chores and domestic work is important as they constitute a large part of child labor in this setting 14 In this paper, we consider children from 6 to 10 versus children from 10 to 15 when considering age heterogeneity. The cut-off at 10 years old was chosen in order to have groups of about equal size, as such maximizing variation in the data. 15 See appendix for further discussion on variation and potential outliers. 16 We use the follow-up data on the control children for the descriptive statistics, as information on child labor in chores and domestic work was not collected in the baseline survey. For the other variables, descriptive patterns in the baseline are similar to those described for the control communities at follow-up. Children are classified in the control group if they resided in the control communities at baseline, in order to avoid any contamination bias. 17 There is a small number of observations for which the total hours in economic activity is known, but it is unclear whether the hours were dedicated to nonagricultural or agricultural work. As a result, the coefficients of hours in nonagricultural activities, agriculture, and livestock in the tables do not add up exactly to the coefficient of hours in total economic activity. Given the schooling conditionality, we analyze whether school attendance and child labor appear to compete for children's time. Table 3 shows that, after accounting for differences in age and gender, children who attend school indeed work on average 4 hours less per week. Children work in particular almost 3 hours less in agriculture, with the remaining hour mainly coming from chores and domestic work. Intriguingly however, school-going children work more in nonagricultural activities. None of these differences capture any household level variation, as the fixed effects control for household socio-economic status and other household unobservables. A possible explanation of the finding on nonagricultural activities is related to the low education levels of the parents whom might need the help of school-going children for basic math and accounting necessary in such activities. Table 3 also shows results for boys and girls separately, and indicates that the negative correlation between child labor in economic activities and school attendance is completely driven by the results for boys. Girls work equal amounts in economic activities, whether they are attending school or not, but boys work on average almost 6 hours less when they attend school. This hence suggests that for boys, school and work might be substitutes, while this is much less the case for girls. This is consistent with the 18 In order to look within the household, we regressed each of the child labor outcomes on a gender dummy and a household fixed effect. 19 The intra-household patterns are consistent and somewhat stronger than the inter-household differences between boys and girls.
timing of work in agriculture-which occurs mainly in the mornings at the same time of classes-and with the specialization of girls and boys in different tasks.
Finally, we consider whether children are at their grade level or below. Children are classified as below their grade level if their accumulated years of education are less than the level they should have attained if they enrolled at age 7 and passed grades every year. Children are classified as at grade level if there is no age-grade distortion. Table 4 shows that there are no significant differences in child labor allocation between children who are below grade level, and their siblings who are at grade level. The relationship between past academic achievement and child labor hence does not appear to be straightforward. On the other hand, work done in other countries around the world (Duflo, 2003 for South Africa; Thomas for Brazil, Ghana and the US) has shown that resources in the hands of women might favor investment in girls. While it is unclear whether this pattern holds in Nicaragua, it could possibly lead to a higher reduction of child labor for girls (see also Emerson and Portela Souza, 2007 ). Yet the program -and in particular the productive investment grant -might also lead to an increased need for help in nonagricultural activities. These are activities in which older girls tend to specialize, and it is unclear whether the increased demand for labor would reinforce or weaken this specialization pattern. Households with the productive investment package possibly also have an increased need for help with domestic work. As the female beneficiary takes up her new activity, this could affect older girls in the household, and lead to a reinforcement of the age and gender patterns. Also, given low levels of literacy in the region, adult program participants might need to rely on children with more advanced math skills (higher schooling levels) for help with the accounting part of the new activity.
III.3. Hypotheses
Does the Atencion a Crisis
Finally, the finding that there are no significant differences in child labor between children who are at grade level versus those that are behind, might indicate that on average parents do not put extra labor burden on children that have fallen behind in school. This could be because higher ability or accumulated skill can increase both the return to child labor and the return to schooling, or because higher ability or accumulated skill can make it easier for children to combine both. If this is the case, one might expect that the additional cash combined with the conditionalities might help parents to compensate for past lags in academic achievement.
IV. Impact of Atencion a Crisis on intra-household child labor allocation
Given that the decision-making in households with the productive investment package needs to account for a number of additional factors, we first analyze the impact on the intra-household allocation of all households from the treatment communities, and then compare the impacts of households with the third package with those with the basic package. We rely on the randomized design, and estimate the impacts using simple differences between the treatment and control households. Hence let where Y ij is the child labor hours (in a specific type of activity) for child j in household i corrected for any gender-specific age-trends based on the estimated trends for the control group (see below). T is a dummy variable indicating the intent-to-treat for household i, X ij a key characteristic of child j in household i that could affect child labor allocation (gender or past academic achievement), captures all unobservable characteristics of household i, while captures the unobservable characteristics of child j in household i.
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We estimate the model using household fixed effects, implying that both the term and cancel out. The estimate of , the coefficient of interaction of the intent-totreat dummy with the various variables of interest then sheds light on the intra-household reallocation in child labor. The model hence allows isolating the heterogeneity in impacts within households along a number of dimensions, while controlling for all unobservable household factors. We first consider differences between children of different gender, and then focus on whether past academic achievement of the child is related to differences in program impact within the household. All standard errors are corrected for clustering at the community level.
As the term cancels out when we include household fixed effects, we also estimate a random effects model in order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimate for . As correlation between explanatory variables and household unobservables might bias the random effects model, the fixed effects model is our preferred specification. Yet the results of the random effects model provide us with a base of comparison that helps to interpret the meaning of the coefficients.
Further, given that the age of the child and possibly gender might be correlated with other variables of interest (such as grade achievement), and in order to increase the precision of the estimates, we first normalize the outcome variables by regressing each outcome on a series of dummies for age (in months) by gender for the control. For outcomes used in the fixed effect estimates, we also include household fixed effects in these estimations. We then obtain the residual by subtracting the estimated outcome for each category from the observed measure. In this paper, we hence measure how child labor hours differ from the average number of hours of a child of the same gender and age. 20 We use the variable measuring the intent-to-treat, rather than treatment itself, to avoid any selection concerns due to the few reclassifications by leaders (see section II.2) or lack of take-up. Table 5 sheds light on the reallocation of child labor within the household as a result of the intervention. The top panel shows that child labor decreases more for boys than for girls, and this is primarily the result of larger decreases for boys in agriculture and livestock activities. Both child labor in all economic activities and total child labor reduce more for boys than for girls, leading to a reduction of the gaps in total numbers worked with 1.5 hours.
IV.1. Gender and age: compensation and specialization
When accounting for heterogeneity by age when considering gender differences in impact, it becomes clear that the reductions in agriculture, livestock, domestic work and total work are particularly large for older boys, when compared to their siblings. In contrast, impact on child labor allocation for older girls does not seem to be larger than for their younger sisters, and there is some indication of an increase in domestic work, relative to their younger sisters. 21 Yet, in terms of total hours worked the impact for girls does not decrease significantly as age increases, which contrasts the results found for boys. In fact, the point estimate for the comparison of impacts on older girls versus younger girls is positive, though not significant. Overall, the P-values in table 5 show that the differences in differential impacts by age for boys compared to girls are very significant for all activities except nonagricultural work and chores. Table 6 shows that the finding that child labor decreases more for older boys compared to both younger boys and girls is robust to different alternative specifications.
First we show that results are similar when controlling for age and gender trends in the regression instead of measuring the dependent variable as a deviation from the agegender specific mean. Second, we add a number of additional child-specific control variables. While the randomization eliminates the need for controls, they could possibly add some precision to the estimates. The child specific controls that are added are number of years of education, a binary variable whether the father of the child lives in the household, the child's rank among all children below 15 in the household, and the child's rank among all children of the same gender below 15 in the household. Each of these control variables is also interacted with the binary variable for gender. 22 The results show that the findings are similar, but that the contrast between older boys and older girls, as well as the contrast between older girls and younger girls become stronger.
In a third specification, only households that have some child labor in the specific activity considered are included to addresses a potential censoring concern. Note first that because the dependent variable is measured as deviations from the mean for children of the same age and gender in the control, there is no clear censoring in this variable.
Nevertheless, there might be a concern related to censoring at 0 of the original child labor variables. Specification 3 excludes all the households that had no children working for each activity, to shed some light on this issue. As can be seen this results in relatively few households for some of the activities (for example nonagricultural work), but overall there are few households (about 68 out of 1594) where none of the children work. More importantly the results are quite similar to the estimates on the full sample. 23 Indeed overall, all three alternative fixed effects specification show that child labor decreased substantially more for older boys when compared both to younger boys, and to their female siblings.
In a final specification, we consider a binary variable for child labor in each activity, as opposed to the continuous variable. This sheds light on whether parents adjust by reducing the number of hours worked of some siblings compared to others, or rather withdraw some children entirely from working. While the point estimates of these estimations mostly point in the same direction, they are generally not significant, suggesting parents adjust the intensity of work, rather than relieving some children completely from their work duties. The child's rank among children below 15 is used rather than the birth order, for lack of information about birth order. Moreover, given that many households are multigenerational and include children of different parents, the presence of any older children (whether siblings or not) is likely to matter. 23 As another robustness check, we have estimated the random effects model using tobit and without first demeaning the dependent variable (with bootstrapped standard errors to correct for clustering at the community level), which shows significant effects that are quite similar in magnitude to those from the OLS model: the gender difference in impact in all economic activity is -1.9 and in overall work -1.4 compared to -1.8 and -1.5 respectively in the OLS random effects model. Note that we cannot estimate the fixed effects model with tobit as it would lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates.
model only including households with the basic package and control households. 24 Given that the productive investment grant might have increased the return to activities in which women specialize, one can wonder whether this package led to a shift of girls' child labor to those activities. While the standard errors are higher because of smaller sample sizes, the results first show that for this group, child labor for boys decreases significantly more than for girls, which appears to be driven by labor in agriculture and livestock. Table 7b also shows that the productive investment package result in a shift of older girls to nonagricultural activities and domestic activities, when compared with their siblings. As a result of both these mechanisms, the gender differences are larger than for the basic package. The productive investment package hence appears to reinforce intra-household specialization of older girls in nonagricultural activities and domestic work. Note that the random effects estimation suggests that the overall impact on child labor of older girls is not significant -in fact the sum of the coefficients is close to 0 (-1.6 + 1.7). Hence while the productive package led to less child labor for younger girls and older boys, it did not significantly affect overall child labor of younger boys and older girls.
Overall then, these results suggest that the conditional cash transfer helped to narrow intra-household gender and age differences in child labor, and older boys in particular appear to have benefited most. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics in table 3 that suggested that school attendance and boys' work in agriculture are negatively correlated with each other. This could indicate that the school conditionality, by guaranteeing that children are in school at the moment they otherwise would be working in the field is helping compensate for the higher number of hours that older boys were working, when compared to their sisters, and their younger siblings. At the same time, there is evidence of increased intra-household specialization of older girls in nonagricultural activities and domestic work for households who received the productive investment package.
IV.2 Past academic achievement
We now consider whether the program helped compensate for lags in past academic achievement, and in particular whether reductions in child labor are larger for children that were lagging behind. Independently of the reasons why certain children in a household are below grade level, it is interesting to see whether parents shifted child labor away from those children and as such might help compensate for lags. Table 8 shows the fixed effect estimation that accounts for heterogeneity of impacts by past academic achievement and gender.
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The results show that boys that were below grade level had a much larger reduction in child labor in economic activities, in particular in agriculture when compared to their brothers; labor for boys that are at least 1 grade behind reduced with 3 hours per week more than labor for other boys. 26 Interestingly however, these boys seem to be shifted into domestic work, as compared to their brothers, and as a result the effect is much smaller, when considering all hours worked. The relative reduction of child labor in economic activity among boys below grade level is even larger when considering only households with the productive investment package. Labor in agriculture, and as a result in total economic activity reduces by almost 4 hours, as compared with their brothers at grade level. As for the full sample, this effect is partially offset by an increase in hours spent in domestic work (results available from the authors). When considering the nonagricultural work, there is some indication that the increase in child labor in this activity is muted for children of both genders who are behind grade level. This is consistent with patterns of specialization in nonagricultural activities by children with higher schooling levels, as shown earlier in the paper. Other than that, we do not find any significant differences in child labor impacts between girls with low versus high past academic achievement.
Overall, the results in past academic achievement hence indicate that the program did help compensate for past lags, but only for boys. Parents responded to the program by reallocating boys with lower skill or ability away from agriculture, but other boys had larger reductions in domestic work.
V. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed whether parental decisions in response to a social program in rural Nicaragua appear to compensate or reinforce pre-program differences in child labor allocation. The paper shows that the program helped compensate for some of these intra-household differences, but exacerbated others. In particular, it reduced total hours worked for older boys, and for boys with low past academic achievements, and these results are driven by reductions in agriculture and livestock. On the other hand, the productive investment package reinforced existing specialization in specific tasks within the household for older girls in particular. Girls in households that received the productive investment package are more likely to increase work in nonagricultural activities and domestic work, when compared to their siblings. This suggests that increased potential for nonagricultural activities in the household reinforced specialization by girls in these tasks. At the same, overall child labor did not increase for these older girls, suggesting that combining the productive investment package with the conditional cash transfer might have been important to avoid an overall increase of child labor of girls.
A possible explanation of these differences in impacts by gender relates to the timing of the different activities. Agricultural work tends to be done in the mornings, at the same time of classes, while nonagricultural work, domestic work, and chores can be done at a time that does not directly compete with class. Moreover, boys' work in agriculture can be substituted for with hired labor, while this is more difficult for the tasks in which the girls specialize. The program increased the likelihood of using wage labor in agriculture with about 20 % (P-value = 0.024), indicating that such substitution indeed might have taken place. On the other hand, the new nonagricultural activities were typically small scale and did not involve any hired labor.
Given that boys--older boys and boys that had fallen behind in school--before the program worked more hours in economic activities compared to their siblings these findings suggest that the program helped level the playing field to a certain extent. While the paper cannot identify whether it is the cash or the conditionality feature of the program design that helped trigger this response, it is consistent with substitution between child work in agriculture and schooling, and with the program impacts on school enrollment and attendance. On the other hand, for both genders, child labor in nonagricultural economic activities and schooling appear to be complements, even within the household, indicating that the return to children's schooling may be higher for such activities, possibly because of low education levels of the adults. Overall, the findings in this paper suggest that time allocation and specialization patterns in child labor within the household are important factors to understand the impact of a program, such as Atencion a Crisis, on child labor.
A possible concern with an analysis that investigates intra-household allocation of child labor in different categories is that the dependent variable is censored at 0. In case of low participation rates the results might then be driven by a few outliers with a large number of hours. As discussed, in this paper the data on the number of hours was trimmed for outliers, and we only consider allocation along dimensions for which there were sufficient households with children in different categories (see the discussion in section 3). To further reduce any concerns about outliers, this appendix presents descriptive statistics of children's participation in each of the categories (a binary variable) and sheds light on the distribution of the conditional number of hours of work in each activity. Table 1 shows the conditional hours of work in each of the categories, separately for treatment and control at follow-up. Not surprisingly, the means differ, but the minimum and maximum values are in the same range for both groups and there are no clear outliers in either group. Tables 2 through 4 then show participation in child labor by age, gender, age-gender, and school assistance category for the control group (analog to the data on the number of hours in table 2 through 4 in the main text.). These data generally show the same patterns as we discussed before: such as more specialization of boys in agriculture and livestock, while girls specialize in domestic chores, livestock and non-agricultural work activities. They also show that participation is common for most of the activities considered.
